We consider the classic cake-divison problem when the cake is a heterogeneous good represented by an interval in the real line. We provide a mechanism to implement, in an anonymous way, an envy-free and e¢cient allocation when agents have private information on their preferences. The mechanism is a multistep sequential game form in which each agent at each step receives a morsel of the cake that is the intersection of what she asks for herself and what the other agent concedes to her.
Introduction
Thomson (1996) pointed out that an allocation rule is conceptually di¤erent from its selections and the normative properties of its outcomes do not coincide with those of the rule itself. This observation generates two basic questions about fairness: should we focus exclusively on the set of allocations in order to determine criteria for fairness or should we also look at the procedure through which the …nal outcome is obtained? Should we take the view of procedure fairness or the view of "end-of-state" fairness, or both?
The classic problem of dividing a heterogeneous good ( a cake) between two agents o¤ers a great opportunity to analyze these questions in a simple framework. As already noted by Crawford (1977) , and previously by Kolm (1972) , the classic divide and choose procedure provides an e¢cient and envy free outcome, but it is hardly considered "fair" when there is complete information on agents' preferences. The divide and choose procedure provides a no-envy outcome but the procedure itself is not envy free: the chooser envies the role of the divider. To put it in a slightly stronger term, agents are not treated symmetrically in the divide and choose procedure. Fairness can be translated in requirements like anonymity, which is directed to guarantee an ex-ante symmetric treatment of the agents, or like no-envy, which demands an ex-post symmetry among the actual allocations of the agents. It is quite obvious that an allocation rule can satisfy some of these requirements while violating others. Keeping with our simple problem, a mechanism which assigns the entire cake to an agent ‡ipping a (fair!) coin, satis…es anonymity (or procedural no-envy) but clearly violates the ("end-of-state") no-envy criterion, while the divide and choose rule when the divider is …xed, satis…es no-envy but violates anonymity.
Reconciling e¢ciency, procedural fairness, and "end-of-state" fairness is not so simple as it could appear at …rst glance. For instance, one could think that the divide and choose procedure when the divider is randomly chosen is the (simplest) way to make the procedure "fair". Nevertheless, introducing a random element in the mechanism has many consequences. The set of alternatives over which agents' preferences are de…ned is now a set of lotteries. The random mechanism which assigns with equal probability to both agents the role of the divider is equivalent to the lottery which assigns to each agent with equal probability one the following two envy-free allocations: the allocation such that agent 1 is indi¤erent over the two portions and the allocation such that agent 2 is indi¤erent over the two portions. Therefore, we need to make the assumption on how agents evaluate lotteries and the normative content of any proposed mechanism will in general be sensitive to the di¤erent assumptions. Moreover, even if we assume standard preferences over lotteries, representable by Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, the simple rule which randomly selects the divider may open the door to ine¢ciency when agents di¤er in the degree of risk aversion.
In this paper, we focus on the fair division problem when the good to be divided is representable by a linear segment of length one and agents' preferences are such that single-cut divisions are e¢cient. Many problems, such as time sharing problems, belong to this class. Consider, for instance, two security guards deciding their shifts during the night: if their preferences depend not only on the number of working hours, but also on their schedule, then the good to be divided (the night hours) is heterogeneous and it can be fair to have shifts of di¤erent length; nevertheless it turns to be e¢cient to divide the night in no more than two shifts, one for each guard. Other examples are related to classic Hotelling models: two ice-cream pedlars have to decide how to partition a beach in two selling regions which can be of di¤erent length, since density of bathers may vary along the beach. Again, in order to minimize the pedlars' e¤ort in commuting, it is e¢cient to partition the beach in two intervals, one for each pedlar.
We propose a normative property which identi…es one allocation among those which are envy-free, and provide an anonymous deterministic mechanism which implements it. Our mechanism is a sequential multi-step version of the divideand-choose mechanism. The assumption that single-cut partitions of the cake are e¢cient, allows to compare our mechanism with the classic divide and choose only on the ground of fairness.
Let's consider the following example. Two kids, Hansel and Gretel, have to divide a rectangular cake which can be represented as the interval [0; 1]. The cake is partly of white chocolate, the interval [0; m] ; and partly of dark chocolate, the interval (m; 1]. Suppose that Hansel prefers the dark chocolate and Gretel the white one, but they are both greedy and to any portion prefer a bigger portion that contains it. Note that any single cut partition of the cake which assigns the left portion to Gretel and the right portion to Hansel is e¢cient. The problem is where to put the knife in order to be fair. There exists an interval of single-cut points, each of them generating an envy-free and e¢cient allocation with di¤erent utility levels to the greedy kids. The divide and choose procedure where either Hansel or Gretel is the divider implements among the e¢cient and no-envy allocations the one preferred by the divider. In order to avoid noisy discussions on who is the divider, their mother would help the kids by providing them a way to select an envy-free and e¢cient allocation in an anonymous way. Uniqueness is relevant in our problem because we cannot leave the kids to choose one allocation in a set of possible solutions, if we really want to avoid noisy discussions. To describe the mechanism in a very intuitive way suppose that the mother knows that Hansel prefers the dark chocolate and Gretel prefers the white. She knows that, once she decides where to put the knife, it is e¢cient to give the left portion to Gretel and the right portion to Hansel. Unfortunately, she does not know how strong the kids' preferences are over the two types of chocolate. Therefore, she let them choose how to cut the cake. In fact, she proposes the following cake-cutting mechanism to the kids.
Gretel proposes to Hansel to cut the cake at ] has still to be assigned and the mechanism is iterated following the same rules until one of the two kids takes one of the portion proposed by the other kid.
The mechanism we propose can be interpreted as a step-by-step negotiation procedure in which agents reach partial agreements. Whenever both agents agree that some part (subset) of the cake should be consumed by one agent, then they accept to assign this part to her. In this way they "reduce" the object over which they dispute and therefore they can more easily reach a de…nitive agreement.
From a normative point of view, should any kid complains with her mother? Should Hansel pretend to be the …rst to choose or Gretel the second one? The answer is "no". No matter who moves …rst, the mechanism implements the same equilibrium allocation. The procedure anonymously selects a no-envy and e¢cient allocation which has the following characteristics. Consider a subgame starting at any stage t of the dividing game and let [a; b] denote the cake still to be divided. In equilibrium, each agent receives at the current stage t a morsel which has the same value as the overall portion that the other agent receives. Let ([a; S] ; (S; b]) be the (e¢cient) subgame perfect equilibrium allocation, where [a; S] is Gretel's portion. Let x t and y t be respectively Gretel and Hansel's proposals at the current stage t according to the subgame perfect equilibrium. Then, Gretel is indi¤erent between the morsel [a; y t ] ; the morsel she receives at stage t; and the portion (S; b]; i.e. the portion that Hansel consumes in the subgame perfect equilibrium allocation. Similarly, Hansel is indi¤erent between the morsel [x t ; b] ; the morsel he receives at stage t; and the portion [a; S] : Therefore in each stage t of the game, both agents receive the minimal no-envy morsel, which makes each of them indi¤erent with respect to the overall portion that the other agent receives in the SPNE allocation of the subgame starting at stage t.
The mechanism described above is slightly more complicated in the general case when the arbitrator does not know how to e¢ciently divide the cake. But the logic of the mechanism is the same. At each stage agents sequentially propose a partition of the cake and, in case no agent takes one of the portions of the allocation proposed by the counterpart, each of them receives the intersection between what she asks for herself and what the other agent concedes her to consume.
Fair division of an heterogeneous good has been widely analyzed both in the mathematical literature and, more recently, in the economic one; see, respec-tively, Brams and Taylor (1996) (2000), among others). In most of these contributions great attention has been devoted to the existence and the axiomatic characterization of a normative solution to this fair division problem, but much less attention to a strategic approach. A relevant exception is the recent paper by Thomson (2005) , who showed a simple game form called "divide and permute" to fully implement in Nash equilibrium the no-envy solution in n-person fair division problem. In this paper we follow a similar approach by proposing a game form of a two-agent fair division problem to implement in subgame perfect equilibrium an envy-free and e¢cient solution in an anonymous way by means of a deterministic mechanism.
Notation and De…nition
Our model is a simple version of the classical cake division problem. There is a measurable space (-; F), where -´[0; 1] (a cake) is the object to be divided between the two agents that can be represented by an interval in the real line, and F is a ¾-algebra over -. We say that an element of F is a portion and that an F-measurable subset of a portion is a morsel. Agents have preferences over portions of -. Each agent i is endowed with a utility function u i : F ! R + that is a nonatomic probability measure on F. 
Let U i be the set of agent i's utility functions and U = (U 1 ; U 2 ) be the set of all utility pro…les.
An (ordered) partition P = (P 1 ; : : : ; P k ) of -constituted only by portions is called a portioned k-partition. An allocation P = (P 1 ; P 2 ) is a portioned two-partition, where P i is the portion assigned to agent i = 1; 2. An allocation P = (P 1 ; P 2 ) is e¢cient (or weakly e¢cient, respectively) at u 2 U if there exists no other allocation P 0 = (P
) for all i, with the strict inequality holding for some i (or u i (P i ) > u i (P i ) for all i). Any 1 A measure u i is nonatomic if, for each partion A and each x in (0; u(A)), there exists another portion B µ A such that u i (B) = x. e¢cient allocation is also weakly e¢cient. 2 An allocation P is envy-free at u 2 U (or satis…es no-envy), if u i (P i )¸u i (P j ) for i = 1; 2:Let P denote the set of allocations.
An allocation rule is a function f : U ! P: Let f i (u) be the portion assigned by the allocation rule f to agent i = 1; 2 at u 2 U . An allocation rule f is envyfree if f (u) is envy-free at every u 2 U: An allocation rule f is e¢cient if f(u) is e¢cient at every u 2 U: An allocation rule is anonymous if interchanging the preferences means interchanging the assigned portion, that is for any (u 1 ; u 2 ) 2 U; if f i (u 1 ; u 2 ) = P i then f i (u 2 ; u 1 ) = P j for both i; j = 1; 2; i 6 = j:
In the paper we concentrate on multi-stage sequential mechanisms. Let Z + be the set of positive integers. Lett be the amount of the heterogeneous good still to be divided at stage t = f1; 2; 3:::; T g with T 2 Z + : By assumption -1´[ 0; 1]: Let P t i denote the morsel of the good that agent i = 1; 2 receives at stage t and P t j the morsel that the other agent receives at the same stage t:
denote the overall portion that agent i's will receive playing the mechanism from stage t onwards; therefore P 1 i = P i . We call P t i agent i's residual portion at stage t. Now we are ready to introduce a more demanding property than no-envy. A multi-stage mechanism is residual-equivalent envy-free if, at each stage, each agent is indi¤erent between getting her current morsel and getting the other agent's residual portion. Any residual-equivalent envy-free mechanism not only is envy-free in each stage, but also equalizes the extent to which an agent prefers his own portion to the other agent's portion. Note that although we introduce the concept of residual-equivalent envy-free in the context of multistage mechanisms, it is well de…ned for any allocation P as in the formal de…nition below. Let (P 1 i ; :::; P T i ) be a partition of agent i's portion P i in T morsels.
De…nition 1 An allocation P = (P 1 ; P 2 ) is residual-equivalent envy-free (REEF) at u 2 U if for each i = 1; 2 there exists a partition (P 1 i ; :::; P
) for all t = f1; 2; :::T g with T 2 Z + . An allocation rule f is residual-equivalent envy-free if f (u) is residual-equivalent envy-free at every u 2 U .
We do not provide any strong normative foundation for this requirement. It is a useful tool to prove that the mechanism that we present implements a noenvy and e¢cient allocation in an anonymous way. In the next section, in fact, we characterize the domain of utility pro…les for which any single cut allocation is e¢cient. Then we show that for any utility pro…le in this domain, there exists a unique allocation that satis…es the above condition. This allocation turns out to be the SPNE allocation of the implementation mechanism we propose.
Existence and Uniqueness of REEF allocations
The classic divide and choose mechanism generates portioned two-partitions. We propose our mechanism as a way of ameliorating it by guaranteeing an anonymous selection of any envy-free and e¢cient allocation. Hence, we focus on the utility pro…le domain in which portioned two-partitions are e¢cient.
Let U sc denote the domain of utility pro…les for which condition A1 holds. Hence, for all utility pro…les in U sc and for all x 2 [0; 1] ; there always exists an allocation generated by the single-cut x which is e¢cient. The following Lemma characterizes the set U sc :
Lemma 1 A su¢cient and necessary condition for (A1) is that
Proof. Su¢ciency. Without loss of generality, suppose
is (weakly) decreasing. Suppose that there is a single-cut partition ([0; a); [a; 1]) which is not e¢cient, then there exists another partition (P 1 ; P 2 ) such that u 1 (P 1 )¸u 1 (0; a) and u 2 (P 2 )¸u 2 (a; 1) with at least one strict inequality. Because u 2 (P 2 )¸u 2 (a; 1) and v 2 (x) > 0 by de…nition; it is impossible that [0; a) ½ P 1 such that the (Lebesgue) measure of P 1 is larger than a: Similarly 
is (weakly) decreasing and A is to the left of B, u 2 (A) < u 2 (B):
; apply the same argument as in (2) and …nd a contradiction. If u 2 (A) = u 2 (B); this is contradictory to the claim that (P 1 ; P 2 ) is Pareto superior to ([0; a); [a; 1]).
Necessity
is not monotonic in x: Without loss of generality, suppose that there exist three points: a; b; c; with 0 < a < b < c < 1; Intuitively, agent 1 can exchange a tiny slice of the cake centered around b with agent 2 for a tiny slice of the cake centered around c, to make both agents better o¤. Let ² b ; ² c be su¢ciently small such that for any
; moreover, the following equation holds:
We can …nd such ² b ; ² c due to the continuity of agents' utility density functions. By construction, agent 1 is indi¤erent between [0; y) and
Similarly, agent 1 can exchange a tiny slice of the cake centered around c with agent 2 for a tiny slice of the cake centered around a; to make both agents better o¤. The formal proof is omitted.
Note 
Proposition 1 For any preference pro…le u 2 U sc , there exists a unique e¢-cient residual-equivalent envy-free allocation.
Proof : We provide the intuition of the proof here. The formal proof is in the appendix. For any u 2 U sc ; if F 
The iterated divide and choose procedure
In this section we present a mechanism to implement the residual-equivalent envy-free allocation in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. In the introduction we pointed out that when agents have complete information on their counterpart's preferences and behave strategically, the classic divide and choose procedure seems far from being satisfactory from a normative point of view. Hence, this is the case where it is more urgent to …nd a mechanism which treats agents symmetrically. The mechanism is a multi-stage sequential procedure such that at every stage each agent has the right to propose an allocation, that is a portioned two-partition of the cake specifying which agent should take each portion. If agents propose di¤erent allocations, than each agent receives the intersection between what she asks for herself and what the other agent concedes to her.
The mechanism Any stage t = f1; 2; :::T g with T 2 Z + is formed by four sequential steps. Let X t be the allocation proposed by agent 1 at stage t and, with a little abuse in notation, let x t 2 [0; 1] denote the single-cut that characterizes this twoportioned partition. Let X t 1 be the portion that agent 1 asks for herself and X
Step 1 Agent 1 proposes an allocation X
1
Step 2. Agent 2 may take either the portion X
Step 4 : If agent 1 does not take any portion and X 1 j \Y 1 j has zero Lebesgue measure for some j = 1; 2, then the entire cake is given to the agent i 6 = j and the game ends. Otherwhise each agent i = 1; 2 receives the morsel
Note that either the game ends or each agent receives a morsel of the cake of positive size, and the cake that has still to be assigned is an interval.
Consider any stage t and denote byt ½ [0; 1] the cake still to be assigned .
Stage t
Step 1 Agent 1 proposes an allocation X t of the caket :
Step 2. Agent 2 may take either the portion X Step 3: Agent 1 may choose to take either one of the two portions Y t 1 , Y t 2 or nothing.
Step 4 : If agent 1 does not take any portion and X t j \ Y t j has zero Lebesgue measure for some agent j = 1; 2, then the entire cake is given to the agent i 6 = j and the game ends. Otherwhise each agent i 2 N receives the morsel
The mechanism ends at stage T when either one of the agents takes a portion proposed by the counterpart or the entire cake -T has been assigned to some agent.
Proposition 2
The e¢cient residual equivalent envy-free allocation is the unique SPNE outcome of the iterated divide and choose mechanism.
Proof: see the appendix. Since we proved that the residual equivalent envy-free allocation is unique, it follows that the mechanism is anonymous, as its symmetric structure suggests.
The mechanism might be in…nite, and therefore it might be interesting to know if a …nite version still has any nice property. Consider a K-truncated version of the mechanism when we exogenously …x the number of iterations, T = K, for any …nite number K; and at the last stage K agents play the classic divide and choose mechanism (i.e. agent 1 proposes a two-portioned partition and agent 2 chooses the portion he prefers). Then, the following corollary holds (which follows from Lemma 3 in appendix). Let T ¤ 2 N be the number of iterations in the SPNE of the non-truncated mechanism.
Corollary 1 In any K¡truncated version of the mechanism the SPNE outcome is e¢cient and envy-free, and (i) for all 1 < K · T ¤ the utility of both agents is higher than the utility level that the chooser achieves if agents play the divide and choose mechanism; (ii) for all K < T ¤ both agents prefer to be agent 1 of the iterated sequential game, but agent 2's utility is increasing in the number of the iterations K:
[12] Kolm, S. C. (1972), Justice et Equité, Paris, Centre National de la Recherche Scienti…que.
[ ; we have F 
, and c 3 ; c < F
Proof of Proposition 2: To prove this proposition we proceed by proving some easy lemmata. Let a t = minfx t¡1 ; y t¡1 g and b t = maxfx t¡1 ; y t¡1 g for all t > 1 and a 1 = 0 and b 1 = 1: We assume that agents only use stationary strategies in the sense that at each stage t agents' strategies only depend upon the cake still to be divided, -t = [a t ; b t ]; and on the proposals made at this stage. From now on we suppose, without loss of generality, that F 
:
Lemma 3 Consider any subgame starting at step 1 of some stage t. Let P t i denote agent i' s portion in the subgame perfect equilibrium allocation of the subgame
; for both i = 1; 2; and for all t = f1; 2; :::; T g : Proof. We actually prove a stronger claim, that is for all t = f1; 2; :::; T g each agent has a strategy that guarantees her to obtain u i (P 
. Hence, agent 2 by taking his preferred portion obtains
: Agent 1 can also guarantee herself at least her half-cakeequivalent utility of stage t: Suppose that agent 1 announces x t = F 
Lemma 4 In all subgame perfect equilibria of the game the mechanism ends only if at stage T 2 Z + , agent 2 chooses one morsel of the allocation proposed by agent 1 and both morsels of the allocation are indi¤erent for agent 2.
Proof. Consider any stage t of the game. By design, the mechanism ends either if one of the agent takes one portion of the allocation proposed by the other agent, or if for some j 2 N X t j \ Y t j = ;: In this last case there exists one agent who receives a morsel of zero Lebesgue measure contradicting Lemma 3. Now we prove the following two claims.
Claim 1: Agent 1 never chooses to end the game at step 3. Suppose that X t 1 = [a t ; x t ]. We already proved that in equilibrium Y t 1 = [a t ; y t ] (otherwhise there exists at least one agent j for which X t j \ Y t j = ;): There are two cases: (i) y t > x t . In this case agent 1's best response is to take the portion [a t ; y t ]. But then agent 2's best response at step 2 cannot be to propose Y t , because taking [x t ; b t ] he would obtain a higher payo¤. (ii) y t < x t : We suppose that agent 1 takes one of the two morsels and we show that this cannot occurs along the equilibrium path. If agent 1 takes the morsel [y t ; b t ], then to announce y t cannot be a best response for agent 2 since he could obtain a morsel [a t ; x t ] at step 2 which contains the morsel [a; y Claim 2: Agent 2 chooses to end the game only if agent 1 partitions the cake in two portions which are indi¤erent for agent 2. Let x t denote the cutpoint proposed by agent 1. If agent 2 takes a portion which is strictly preferred by him to the other portion, then it must be that either x t > F Since the SPNE outcome is e¢cient, and the game is a sequential game with perfect information, if there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game, then it is unique in terms of utility. Suppose, in fact, that there are at least two SPNEs which are not unique in terms of utility. Since the game is of perfect information, then any information set is a singleton. Since the game is also sequential, then there exists at least one player who is indi¤erent between the two SPNE outcomes, otherwise he is not playing a best response in at least one of his information sets. If one agent is indi¤erent between the two SPNE equilibria and they are not unique in terms of utility, then the other player strictly prefers one SPNE outcome to the other, and e¢ciency is violated in at least one case.
It follows that, if it exists, the SPNE outcome of the game is a single cut partition that we denote by (P 1 ; P 2 ) : Let S 2 We prove now that the strategy T2 is a best response to strategy T1 in all subgames. We consider the following three cases:
(i) X : T2 strategy prescribes that agent 2 takes the portion [x t ; b t ] : Note that the allocation ([a t ; x t ] (x t ; b t ]) is e¢cient and that agent 1's utility level is lower than her half-cake equivalent utility. If agent 2 deviates, he can either take the portion [a t ; x t ] ;which is obviously a less valuable portion than (x t ; b t ] ; or make a di¤erent proposal. But then agent 1 according to T1 at step 3 chooses an action which is a best response in all subgames. By Lemma 3 agent 1's utility is equal or higher than the half-cake equivalent utility. Therefore by proposing any allocation agent 2 lowers his payo¤.
(ii) X 
